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PRISONER LITIGATION: HOW IT BEGAN IN
LOUISIANA
Wilbert Rideau & Billy Sinclair*
A POWER LEGITIMIZED
American prisons are filled with people who are poor and uneducated,
with a substantial number being functionally illiterate. As a class, prison
inmates have very little knowledge and understanding of the law. They
perceive it, in a narrow sense, as the power of the system; a power that is
enforced by the police, prosecutors, and judges. By perception they un-
derstand that the law is applied markedly different to those at the top of
the social structure than to those at the bottom. By experience they under-
stand that those at the bottom see the raw and ugly side of the law. For
these reasons, the law must always be checked and its power balanced-
and that is a major role of the lawyer. Famed attorney Clarence Darrow
understood this role when he said: "I have lived my life, and I have fought
many battles, not against the weak and the poor-anybody can do that-
but against power, against injustice, against oppression, and I have asked
no odds from them, and I never shall."'
Since the role of the lawyer is often perceived as being an adversarial
check on the power of the system, some of the more intelligent inmates
strive to become jailhouse lawyers. Since most prisoners come from the
ranks of the poor and disadvantaged, the intelligent convict uses a mixture
of gutter cunning and sophisticated Machiavellian manipulation to build a
base of power. Thus, prison is a ruthless world governed by rumor, mis-
understanding, misinformation, and paranoia-and the knowledge of the
jailhouse lawyer translates into a power to not only influence attitudes and
behavior, but to assist in solving problems.
Because prison officials considered that kind of power a threat to the
discipline and security of the prison, they traditionally opposed the practice
of jailhouse law-frequently establishing rules prohibiting it. That was the
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case in Tennessee in 1965 when William Joe Johnson, an inmate serving a
term of imprisonment for life, was placed in solitary confinement for
practicing jailhouse law in violation of a prison rule. 2 Johnson took his
case to court, arguing that the rule effectively denied prisoners their right
to access to the courts.3 The case eventually reached the United States
Supreme Court, and in 1969 the Court handed down a decision that would
have a major impact on the nation's prison system. The Court in Johnson
v. Avery4 held that unless the state provides some alternative means of
assisting inmates in the preparation of their post-conviction pleadings,
prison officials could not enforce a rule prohibiting inmates from assisting
each other in the preparation of such pleadings.
Speaking for the seven-member majority, Justice Abe Fortas pointed
out that
the initial burden of presenting a claim for post-conviction relief
usually rests upon the indigent prisoner himself with such help as
he can obtain within the prison walls or the prison system. In the
case of all except those who are able to help themselves-usually
a few old hands or exceptionally gifted prisoners-the prisoner is,
in effect, denied access to the courts unless such help is available.'
Justice Fortas added that, without the assistance of jailhouse lawyers,
many inmates would never have possibly valid constitutional claims heard
by the courts. 6
The Johnson decision was not embraced by prison officials. It legitim-
ized a power they had worked diligently, even unscrupulously, to control.
In dissent, Justice Byron White articulated the concern of many prison
officials when he said that the "aim of the jailhouse lawyer is not the
service of truth and justice, but rather self-aggrandizement, profit, and
power." 7 During that era, Justice White's observations had substantial
2. Guidance Manual for Prisoners, Sec. VI, Tennessee State Penitentiary, p. 7:
No inmate will advise, assist or otherwise contract to aid another, either with
or without a fee, to prepare Writs or other legal matters. It is not intended
that an innocent man be punished. When a man believes he is unlawfully held
or illegally convicted, he should prepare a brief or state his complaint in letter
form and address it to his lawyer or a judge. A formal Writ is not necessary
to receive a hearing. False charges or untrue complaints may be punished.
Inmates are forbidden to set themselves up as practitioners for the purpose of
promoting a business of writing Writs.
3. Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (State prison regulation
forbidding prisoners from preparing habeas corpus petitions for other prisoners was invalid
as interfering with federal statutory right of prisoners, incapable of acting for themselves,
to have someone act on their behalf); Johnson v. Avery, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967)
(State prison regulation prohibiting any inmate from advising or assisting other prisoners
in preparation or filing of writs of habeas corpus or other legal papers was valid).
4. 393 U.S. 483, 89 S. Ct. 747 (1969).
5. Id. at 488, 89 S. Ct. at 750.
6. Id. at 487, 89 S. Ct. at 750.
7. Id. at 499, 89 S. Ct. at 756.
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merit. There were only a few jailhouse lawyers in the nation's prison
system, especially in Louisiana, and, for the most part, they did use their
limited legal skills as mercenary weapons to secure homosexual favors and
financial gain from gullible inmates and garner influence and status with
inmate power-brokers. As a rule, the original jailhouse lawyers were master
politicians who maneuvered themselves into positions of power by extend-
ing to the weak and strong alike the promise of beating the system. Their
power rested in hope-men confined in the insignificance of prison will
barter for any kind of hope, even if it is false. Fool's gold is better than
no gold.
However, Johnson v. Avery ultimately proved to be a good decision
for the nation's prison system. As jailhouse lawyers matured and devel-
oped an understanding of their role, they became an asset to prison ad-
ministrators who increasingly had to face the problems of violence and
disturbances during the 1970's. Prison officials came to realize that jail-
house law, more than any other force, encouraged the belief that problems
and grievances could be expressed and even resolved in an orderly fashion
within the framework of the system.
THE HANDS-OFF DOCTRINE
In 1948 the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Price v. Johnson8
which, even though it was not a conditions-of-confinement case, proved
to have a tremendous influence on challenges by inmates of the various
conditions of their confinement. Price was a federal prisoner in Alcatraz
who argued that a federal appeals court had the power to order his pro-
duction before the court so that he could present oral arguments in his
case. While agreeing that the appeals court indeed had the power to order
the production of an inmate before its bench, the Supreme Court added:
"Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation
of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system." 9
That quote was used as a signal from the Supreme Court that federal
courts should not interfere with the internal operations of a penal institu-
tion unless a clear abuse of a constitutionally protected right of an inmate
had occurred. That attitude became known as the "hands-off" doctrine,
and it was derived from a judicial belief that "correctional decisions were
guided by rehabilitative goals, were therapeutic in nature and thus did not
need, or were inappropriate subjects for, judicial review."' 0
8. 334 U.S. 266, 68 S. Ct. 1049 (1948).
9. Id. at 285, 68 S. Ct. at 1060.
10. Recommended Procedures For Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in the Federal
Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, p. 30 (1980).
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The first significant chink in the armor of the "hands-off" doctrine
came in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape" in which the Supreme Court said that
an individual can sue for damages and seek injunctive relief in federal
court against state abuses of his rights. Two years later in McNeese v.
Board of Education the Supreme Court dealt a crippling blow to the
"hands-off" doctrine when it firmly established that state remedies did
not have to first be exhausted prior to seeking federal relief. The Supreme
Court quoted Judge Murrah from Stapleton v. Mitchell: 'We yet like to
believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human rights under the Federal
Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication, and that we
have not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because
the rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum.""' 3
But the federal courts in Louisiana did not hear the distant death knell
for the "hands-off" doctrine. In 1964 Edgar Labat, a black inmate who
had been on death row since 1957, filed one of the original prisoners'
rights lawsuits in the State of Louisiana. 4 The lawsuit was filed after
prison officials moved to restrict Labat's correspondence with a white
woman from Stockholm, Sweden under the provisions of Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 15:568.15 Labat charged that the restriction was racially
motivated, but prison officials said that their actions were necessary to
curb a large volume of pornographic mail being sent to death row inmates
from women in foreign countries.
Federal District Court Judge E. Gordon West summarily dismissed
Labat's complaint, saying that prison officials had a right to restrict an
inmate's mail as long as the restriction was not racially discriminatory. 6
Significantly, Judge West resorted to the traditional "hands-off" language
in dismissing the complaint: "In brief, the federal courts do not, apart
from due process considerations, have the power to supervise or regulate
the ordinary control, management and discipline of the inmates of prisons
operated by the state . . . . "7 Relying on the often-cited Price v. Johnson
11. 365 U.S. 167, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
12. 373 U.S., 668, 83 S. Ct. 1433 (1963).
13. Id. at 674 n.6, 83 S. Ct. at 1437 n.6.
14. Labat v. McKeithen, 243 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1965).
15. La. R.S. 15:568 (1981) provides:
The director of the Department of Corrections, or a competent person selected
by him, shall execute the offender in conformity with the death warrant issued
in the case. Until the time of his execution, the Department of Corrections
shall incarcerate the offender in a manner affording maximum protection to
the general public, the employees of the department, and the security of the
institution.
16. Labat, 243 F. Supp. at 666.
17. Judge West concluded that:
[hlf the state has the right to deprive him [Labat] of his very life, through
execution for the commission of a capital offense, then certainly it has a right,
as part of the ultimate punishment, to deprive him of other privileges along
the way to the final reckoning, just so long as such deprivations are imposed
according to law, and on a non-discriminatory basis.
243 F. Supp. at 666.
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quote, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Judge West's decision,
pointing out that one of the rights lost by an inmate as a result of incar-
ceration is the free use of the mails.' 8
It was five years before Judge West reported on another conditions-
of-confinement suit filed by an inmate: the case of Albert Willis, an inmate
in the East Baton Rouge Parish Jail, who filed a mandamus petition
alleging a denial of adequate and proper medical treatment. 9 Treating the
mandamus petition as a civil rights complaint under United States Code
section 1983, Judge West deferred to the authority of prison officials to
decide what kind of care and supervision an inmate should have. Citing
one of the Fifth Circuit's lead "hands-off" decisions in Granville v. Hunt,20
Judge West concluded that: "[tihe medical treatment of inmates is a matter
for prison officials and this petition does not allege such inadequacy of
medical treatment as to warrant the intervention of the federal court." '2'
The year after the Willis decision, Judge West dismissed a crudely
drafted pro se petition filed by condemned inmate Billy Sinclair 22 challeng-
ing living conditions on Louisiana's death row. 23 Sinclair appealed to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and, for the first time, the appeals court
departed from its traditional "hands-off" stance, remanding the case to
Judge West for a hearing.2 4 Citing the recent and well-publicized case of
Holt v. Sarver,25 the Fifth Circuit said: "Although federal courts are
reluctant to interfere with the internal operation and administration of
prisons, we believe that the allegations appellant has made go beyond
matters exclusively of prison discipline and administration; and that the
court below should adjudicate the merits of appellant's contentions of
extreme maltreatment .... "26
The Fifth Circuit decided Sinclair v. Henderson in November, 1970,
and four months later it was cited by Federal District Court Judge Ben C.
Dawkins as authority for maintaining a civil rights suit filed by a Bossier
Parish jail inmate. 27 It had become apparent that the "hands-off" doctrine
was no longer the prevailing judicial attitude in Louisiana.2 8 The doctrine
breathed its last gasp in 1971 (ten years after Monroe v. Pape) when Judge
West handed down the first reported prisoners' rights litigation victory in
18. Labat v. McKeithen, 361 F.2d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 1966).
19. Willis v. White, 310 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. La. 1970).
20. 411 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1969).
21. Willis, 310 F. Supp. at 207.
22. Co-author of this article.
23. Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971).
24. Sinclair v. Henderson, 435 F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
26. Sinclair, 435 F.2d at 126.
27. Wood v. Maryland Cas. Co., 322 F. Supp. 436, 440 (W.D. La. 1971).
28. Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 189 (5th Cir. 1971); Parker v. McKeithen,
330 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. La. 1971), vacated, 488 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Louisiana in Sinclair v. Henderson. 29 Judge West extended minimum due
process safeguards to inmates facing discipline at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary3 ° and held that extended periods in solitary confinement, with-
out the benefit of exercise, violated the cruel and unusual punishment
provisions of the Federal Constitution.' Sinclair v. Henderson ushered in
the new "open-door" policy of the Federal judiciary, making prisoners'
rights litigation a continuing reality in Louisiana.12
In a legal sense, Sinclair v. Henderson was significant only because it
became a precedent for extending the right of exercise to prisoners held in
a lockdown status for extended periods of time. 3 However, Sinclair v.
Henderson had far-reaching ramifications that transcended its legal signif-
icance. Sinclair dramatically altered the official attitude at the Louisiana
State Penitentiary, laying the foundation for Angola being transformed
from a purely custodial institution into a treatment facility as well as
destroying the traditional penal philosophy of arbitrary and absolute con-
trol of the inmate's life by the institution, and firmly establishing that
prisoners did indeed have some rights. This new reality did not set well
with Angola's traditional plantation mentality, and it set into motion a
bloody conflict between the old order and the new order.
THE OLD VERSUS THE NEW
The Louisiana State Penitentiary has always been known simply as
"Angola." The prison's history was written in the blood of the shackled
souls who were forced to toil in its sugar cane fields as atonement for their
crimes. A brutal army of shotgun-toting convict guards called "khaki
backs," 34 numbering as many as 600, drove the inmates until they dropped
from exhaustion and killed them when they tried to rebel or escape. There
was little farm machinery to ease the back-breaking labor as the inmates
worked the rich Mississippi River bottom to turn a profit for the corrupt
29. 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971).
30. Id. at 1129.
31. Id. at 1131.
32. Santiago v. Sowers, 347 F. Supp. 1055 (M.D. La. 1972); Cherry v. Goslin, 350
F. Supp. 1162 (W.D. La. 1972); Matthews v. Henderson, 354 F. Supp. 22 (M.D. La.
1973); Aulds v. Foster, 484 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. Miller v. Carson, 392 F. Supp. 515, 521 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Miller v. Carson, 401
F. Supp. 835, 891 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F. Supp. 869, 877 (M.D.
Pa. 1976); Nadeau v. Helgemore, 423 F. Supp. 1250, 1269 (D.N.H. 1976); Ahrens v.
Thomas, 434 F. Supp. 873, 898 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Laaman v. Helgemore, 437 F. Supp.
269, 310 (D.N.H. 1977); Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 379 (5th Cir. 1977); Jefferson
v. Southworth, 447 F. Supp. 179, 189 (D. R.I. 1978); Lock v. Jenkins, 464 F. Supp. 541,
551 (N.D. Ind. 1978); Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 545 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Parnell v. Waldrep, 511 F. Supp. 764, 771 (W.D. N.C. 1981); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d
1115, 1152 n.173 (5th Cir. 1982).
34. Convict guards got this name because they wore khaki uniforms while the other
inmates wore pin-striped uniforms.
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political interests that controlled the prison. During one thirty-year period
in the prison's hellish history, an estimated 3,000 prisoners died from
overwork, exposure, brutality, and murder.35
When C. Murray Henderson took over the reins as Warden of Angola
in 1968, the prison was still poisoned with corruption, politics, and pa-
tronage. Factional feuding between prison personnel for power and control
was fierce. The wardenship had changed hands nine times in the four years
preceeding Henderson's arrival-it was a time of turbulence and pain. The
general public expected Angola to show a profit or, at the least, be self-
supporting, a demand reflected in the prison's grossly inadequate budget.
Henderson's arrival, hailed by the news media as a giant step toward penal
reform, found inmates laboring long, hard hours under the broiling sun
cultivating sugar cane in snake-infested fields. The only right enjoyed by
the inmates was the right to die. It was the twilight of the era of tyranny,
of rule by the strongest-by both personnel and inmates.
Henderson, a nationally-acclaimed penologist, faced the immense task
of controlling the chaos within the prison, redirecting the goals of its
operation, making the brutish existence of the inmates more humane, and
generally trying to usher the prison into the twentieth century. It was a
seemingly impossible task for Henderson who was an honest, compassion-
ate, and decent man-qualities that made him a misfit in the world of
Angola. The prison was far-removed in time and distance from the rest of
the world, and its security power-brokers had little respect for honesty and
decency. It was a perverse world, totally alien to everything Henderson
represented.
The Angola prisoner lived in a sub-human world in which the strong
survived and ruled, while the weak served and perished. It was a time of
cliques, lawlessness, and violence-anything was possible, including the
ownership of as many slaves3 6 as a convict could claim and hold. The
strong routinely enslaved the weak, and new inmates entering the prison
had to pass a test of violence to determine the status they would have in
the prison community-"man" or "slave." The younger slaves served as
effeminate homosexuals, while the older slaves served as servants who were
made to produce income for their owners. In keeping with prison tradition,
slaves were bought, sold, and traded among the strong. This practice was
accepted as a natural part of prison life by both inmates and security
35. M. Carleton, Politics and Punishment 46 (1971).
36. A "slave" was a prisoner who belonged to and served the interests of another
prisoner. While some prisoners became slaves because they simply could not or would
not fight, most had no real choice. Young prisoners were gang-raped by as many as 20
inmates in one night and in the presence of an entire dorm while others, who were not
used for sexual purposes, were gang-beaten into complete submission. Human life had
no value in Angola.
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officials.17
At the beginning of Henderson's tenure, Angola was still living in the
age of racial segregation. White and black inmates lived in separate dor-
mitories, and while they ate in the same dining hall, a wooden partition
ran down the center of the huge facility, separating their respective eating
areas. The two races lived in a world of co-existence. However, within the
basic framework of this racially-segregated world, there were sub-worlds
of vicious classism. Prisoners were ruthlessly divided along two social lines:
the "urbs" from New Orleans and the "bumpkins" from anywhere other
than New Orleans. New Orleans prisoners controlled the prison society
and its subcultural vices. While a few "bumpkins" were able to rise to
positions of prominence and respect in the prison's subculture, most bump-
kins lived in a brutal world of oppression and slavery. As with any class
trapped in a world of have-nots held to a level of utter powerlessness and
deprivation, the "bumpkins" served the powerful and dominant New Or-
leans cliques.
Edwin Edwards became governor of Louisiana in 1972, entering office
with a vow to clean up the state's penal system-at a time when Angola
was a boiling cauldron of controversy and dangerous potential, a spark
away from reducing the Attica tragedy"8 to a minor skirmish by compari-
son. Charges by former State Representative Dorothy Taylor that the
prison was overcrowded, corrupt, and mismanaged repeatedly captured
press headlines. Allegations of convicts having been murdered by prison
officials and listed as "escapees" kept surfacing.3 9 The horror stories trans-
lated into sensational headlines that brought about an increasing public
37. Several well-known security officers had their own slaves. They had claimed them
as inmates did and used them for sexual purposes. Some of the guards lost their identities
and became lost in the brutal psychology of the world of the kept.
38. In September 1971, the same month that Sinclair v. Henderson was decided,
inmates at New York's Attica Correctional Facility seized control of the prison, taking
guards and inmates as hostages. Following a long standoff in which negotiations repeatedly
failed to reach a solution, several hundred state troopers and sheriff's deputies stormed
the prison. In nine and one-half minutes, they fired over 2,000 rounds of amunition
directly into the yard, killing 39 people in the largest one-day massacre on American soil
since the Civil War. Besides the dead, three hostages, 85 inmates and one state police
lieutenant suffered gunshot wounds during the assault. S. Bello, Doing Life, The Ex-
traordinary Saga of America's Greatest Jailhouse Lawyer 204-05 (1982).
39. Rumors circulated in Angola of secret grave-digging expeditions searching for the
bodies of dead inmates. The rumors were influenced by the sensational scandal that
Thomas Murton, Superintendent of the Arkansas State Penitentiary, created in 1968 when
he led similar grave-digging expeditions at the Cummins Prison Farm. Murton was fired,
creating a national belief that all Southern prisons have hidden graveyards of murdered
inmates. That belief was given credence in 1970 when John Haley, chairman of Arkansas'
prison board, revealed that "between 1916 and 1950 there were 100 Negroes and 107
whites who were listed as escapees and never recaptured" and said that he believed that
many of them were buried in the fields of the Cummins Prison Farm. Murton, The
Effects of Prison Reform: The Arkansas Case Study, Prisoners' Rights Sourcebook 472
(1980).
[Vol. 451068
PRISONER LITIGATION
demand to do something about the scandalous conditions at the prison.
Given that political backdrop, the first task of the Edwards adminis-
tration was to get Angola off the front page of the state's daily newspa-
pers. The governor promptly appointed Baton Rouge attorney Elayn Hunt,
a long-time prison reform crusader, as Director of Corrections, making
her the first woman to ever head the state's penal system. In the ultra-
masculine world of the prison, Hunt's appointment rankled Angola's se-
curity power-holders. They regarded her as a "prison reform liberal" and
that made them perceive her as a friend of the inmates. Inmates encour-
aged that perception by shouting with glee at her appointment and hailing
her arrival as the answer to all the prison's deeply rooted problems.
With Sinclair v. Henderson altering the way prison officials could
discipline inmates and the efforts of Representative Taylor making political
waves and the appointment of a liberal reformist as Director of Correc-
tions, the prisoners' rights movement had arrived in Louisiana and was
touching every segment of the prisoner's daily existence. 40 The movement
was given added impetus when Hunt, in one of her first official acts,
closed Angola's infamous Red Hats, a brutal solitary confinement unit
built in the mid-1930's. The Red Hats stood as a historical symbol of the
prison's brutal and bloody past, and while it was seldom used at the time
of its closure, it nonetheless stood as an ominous reminder of what the
prison had done and could do to the humanity it confined. With the
closure of the Red Hats, Elayn Hunt told everyone, inmate and personnel
alike, that there would be a new penal philosophy governing Angola.
By April of 1972, Angola had become a restless and dangerous beast.
A Black Panther militancy had crept into the inmate's daily life and dom-
inated the prison's subcultural thinking. It was fashionable to be a
"Panther." The label symbolized strength, defiance, and violence-traits
necessary for survival in the prison during that era. Encouraged by militant
acts and the radical political rhetoric capturing headlines around the na-
tion, Angola's political militancy grew bolder, more ominous, and more
intimidating. Secret societies formed within the broader militant following,
with some inmates being tortured and forced to vow allegiances to radical
political beliefs.
While Hunt worked to establish her new and progressive penal philos-
ophy throughout the state's prison system, some militants plotted to ignite
a spark that would cause Angola to explode in violence. They wanted
nothing less than a bloody Attica-like rebellion, and they were prepared
to achieve its imagined glory, regardless of the consequences. A sinister
plan circulated through the prison's grapevine. Twelve of the prison's
40. Alvin J. Bronstein wrote, "When Attica exploded in September 1971, it created
an unmatched awareness of prisons and their nature. It was no longer true that prisons
and prisoners were 'out of sight, out of mind.' The prisoners' rights movement began
in earnest." Bronstein, Offender Rights Litigation: Historical and Future Developments,
Prisoners' Rights Sourcebook 9-10 (1980).
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known informants would be killed, and each would have his head and
genitals severed. Assassination teams were designated. The assassins would
be armed with knives and hatchets, each moving simultaneously to elimi-
nate their respective targets. It was a ruthless plot aimed at whipping the
rest of the inmate population in line, showing them what they could expect
if they did not cooperate with the political objectives of the militants. With
the inmate population intimidated, the scenario called for a major riot
that would destroy the physical structure of the prison itself.4 '
But the unexpected happened. Brent Miller, a young, inexperienced
security officer, walked into a dormitory on the Big Yard of the Main
Prison Complex where one of the militant teams was preparing for its
mission. The militants murdered Miller, stabbing him repeatedly and cut-
ting his throat. The killing turned Angola's undisciplined security force
into an enraged mob seeking revenge. Lynch-fever burned in their brain.
Local residents, barroom patrons, and area farmers came to the prison
and were deputized. Armed with machine guns, shotguns, and ball-bats,
the security force beat, tortured, and brutalized prisoners indiscriminately.
One white prisoner, seeing a black inmate being beaten, hollered an ob-
scenity at the security officers through a dorm window. The security offi-
cers opened the door of the all-white dorm and grabbed the first white
prisoner passing. They stomped him to the floor and beat him uncon-
scious. The slightest sign of resistance was brutally crushed as the white
security mob swept through the black prisoner population. Tear gas, mace,
and ball-bats were the most frequently used weapons. Black inmates were
interrogated for hours, routinely beaten and tortured for the slightest bit
of information about the militants.
At one point during the violent aftermath, Angola's Deputy Warden
Lloyd W. Hoyle was pushed through a plate glass window by angry secu-
rity officers during a meeting with security personnel. Some of the officers
held Hoyle responsible for Miller's death because only a few days before
he had released a group of militants from maximum security. The militants
had been locked down on what was called the "Panther Tier"-a maxi-
mum security tier housing suspected militants. Two of the released mili-
tants were later identified as being part of the group that killed Brent
Miller.
Despite the volatile emotions, Warden Henderson managed to prevent
a bloodbath. He spent many hours visiting isolation, maximum security,
and the general prison in the weeks following Miller's death. He followed
up on leads and rumors of brutality. He ordered, chided, and maneuvered
his security staff in such a way as to minimize the effects of their rage.
Even with threats being made on his life, Henderson continued to make
his rounds throughout the prison. He visited and talked with brutalized
41. A glimpse at the political turmoil brewing at the prison can be found in Elie v.
Henderson, 340 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. La. 1972), a case that reflected the militancy in its
infancy.
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inmates, ordering some sent to the hospital for treatment. It was those
efforts by Henderson that kept anyone else from being killed.
However, despite Henderson's efforts, security officials locked up sev-
eral hundred inmates in maximum security following Miller's death, and
nearly every one of them was brutally beaten before they were placed in
a cell. The Miller killing provided an official license for indiscriminate
terror and violence against black inmates, especially those suspected of
being militant. But the brutal repression of the prison's political conscious-
ness would have far-reaching side effects. The criminal element of the
inmate population made their own power moves to isolate the militants,
setting them up to be placed in lockdown or having them stabbed during
the period of emotional turbulence. Frequently, the criminal and security
power-brokers worked hand-in-hand because they shared a mutual interest
of returning the prison to its normal, corrupt keel.
Naturally, since the increased security used up the prison's limited cell
space to lock up suspected militants, it was safer for the criminal power-
brokers to deal narcotics, perpetuate homosexual enslavement, and operate
profitable loan-sharking and protection rackets. And by cooperating with
security to nail the militants, the criminal element acquired a stockpile of
favors and obligations needed to protect their vices and profits. Such
unholy arrangements contributed significantly to Angola's reputation as
the "bloodiest prison in the nation."
SETTING THE STAGE FOR HAYES WILLIAMS
One year after the death of Brent Miller, violence had dramatically
escalated at Angola. Death duels were waged on a near daily basis-and
they were fought with homemade but high-quality knives, hatchets, swords,
and occasionally with zip-guns and handguns. For battle gear, the inmates
constructed sophisticated helmets, shields, and chest armor. Estimates of
the level of violence in Angola in 1973 ranged from 11 to 16 inmates being
killed and an additional 150 stabbed. That figure represented a substantial
increase over the 1972 figure of 8 stabbing deaths and 51 stabbings. 42
In an effort to curb the violence and ease the tensions tearing at the
fabric of the prison, Elayn Hunt established the Prisoner Grievance Com-
mittee, a body of thirty-seven inmates selected by popular vote to represent
the inmate population in regular face-to-face negotiations with Angola's
top-level administrative staff. Shortly after the committee was given de-
partmental approval, a group of black and white inmates met, formulated
the objectives of the committee, and drafted its bylaws and constitution. 43
42. See Breaux v. State, 314 So. 2d. 449, 453 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975) and Williams
v. Edwards, 547 F.2d. 1206, 1211 (5th Cir. 1977) for additional figures concerning the
level of violence.
43. In a secret meeting, Billy Sinclair, Douglas Dennis, Robert Matthews, Frank
Bagala, Leotha Brown, and Harold Sneed met and decided to distribute the power of
the committee along racial lines. Since the majority of the prison population was black,
it was agreed that there would be four black and three whites on the seven-man Executive
Committee (the group that actually negotiated with the administration). Matthews was
named as chairman, a position that was largely ceremonial, while Sinclair was tagged as
secretary, the position of real power on the committee.
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Unfortunately, the committee survived less than six months before suc-
cumbing to internal political feuding and harrassment by security person-
nel; however, in the few months of its existence, the committee made
substantial gains in the problem-solving arena and in obtaining privileges
still enjoyed by inmates today. The gains were primarily the result of
efforts by Hunt and her legal counsel, Richard Crane, who maintained the
pressure on Angola officials to not only negotiate in good faith but to
preserve their commitments to the inmates.
Shortly after the collapse of the Prisoner Grievance Committee, War-
den Henderson called together a group of black and white inmate leaders
to announce the integration of the Main Prison Complex. In the presence
of several Justice Department officials, Henderson told the inmates that
they would be given an opportunity to integrate the prison themselves if it
could be done non-violently. Justice Department officials were on hand to
let the inmates know that they had no choice in the matter, that the prison
would be integrated either through cooperation or by force of authority.
Black and white inmate leaders agreed to try and achieve the seemingly
impossible task on their own.4 4 Each leader was aware that the inmate
population was heavily armed and did not welcome integration. When they
walked away from the meeting with Henderson, each leader knew that he
was stepping into a situation in which rumor, misinformation, and insti-
gation could set off a bloody race riot.
The leaders had a difficult task in selling the inevitability of integration
to the rest of the inmate population. Fear, anger, and paranoia made it
difficult for the black and white leaders to strike agreements among them-
selves. Their negotiations lasted for hours, and their meetings were rife
with distrust and hostility as each leader jockeyed for the best position for
the particular interests he represented. Finally, after a week of proposals,
disagreements, and eventual compromises, the leaders worked out an ac-
ceptable plan, and the Main Prison Complex was successfully integrated
without a single violent incident.
While there was no racial violence as a result of the integration, indi-
vidual violence was increasing at an alarming rate. In early July of 1973,
a white inmate was stabbed to death in front of two security officers. He
was stabbed at least 30 times (nine directly through the heart) as the two
guards watched, too terror-stricken to act. In late July, open warfare broke
out between black cliques from New Orleans and Shreveport. Several men
were stabbed with knives and swords and one had his arm severed by a
wild swing from a hatchet. Only the seriously wounded went to the hos-
44. Sinclair, Irvin Breaux, Herman Smith, Philip Hutchins, James Guinn, Ferdinant
Boutte, Paul Lacoste and Douglas Dennis were the leaders who worked out the integration
plan. Of the leaders, Breaux and Guinn were dead within six months-Breaux was killed
in a knife fight and Guinn died from an overdose in an isolation cell. Hutchins, Bouttee
and Lacoste were eventually released from Angola. Dennis escaped in 1978 and remains
on the lam. Sinclair and Smith are still at Angola.
1072 [Vol. 45
PRISONER LITIGATION
pital. The rest returned to their dorms where they were treated by their
friends.
During the first week of August, violence erupted between two feuding
New Orleans factions of white inmates. Sterling Mitchell, one of the pris-
on's toughest inmates, was stabbed to death in his sleep. The following
night Mitchell's killer, a young kid named Ricky Rachal, 41 was also stabbed
to death in his sleep. A friend of Mitchell's, adhering to the "eye for an
eye" code of vengeance, buried a butcher knife in Rachal's chest as he lay
sleeping, supposedly under the watchful and protective eye of two friends.
The violent summer of 1973 clearly showed that Angola was out of
control and that something had to be done. Little did anyone know that a
solution to the prison's massive problems was in the offing. It came in
1973 when four black inmates, led by Hayes Williams, filed an unheralded
lawsuit in Federal Court in Baton Rouge alleging that minority inmates
were discriminated against at Angola, that conditions at the prison
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, and that the conditions vio-
lated state fire and sanitation codes. 46 Two years after the lawsuit was
filed, Judge West'adopted a report by then Special Master Frank Polozola
that found that conditions at Angola would "shock the conscience of any
right thinking person" and "flagrantly violated basic constitutional re-
quirements as well as applicable State laws" and that "the State authori-
ties, who have the power to do so, are either failing or refusing to take
the necessary steps to correct these conditions." 47
The Polozola findings were a blistering indictment of the state's prison
system, but it was a welcomed indictment. The Edwards' administration
embraced the "court order, ' 48 using it to spur the Legislature into appro-
priating the massive amounts of money needed to clean up the state's
prison system. Tragically, the lady who most wanted the court order did
not live to see it implemented-Elayn Hunt died in early 1976, shortly
after Henderson had left Louisiana to become commissioner of the trou-
bled Tennessee Department of Corrections. C. Paul Phelps, Hunt's deputy
director, found himself suddenly responsible for the management of both
the Louisiana State Penitentiary and the Department of Corrections, a
task he handled by flying back and forth each day between Angola and
corrections headquarters in Baton Rouge.
In March of 1976 Phelps was officially made Corrections Secretary
and Ross Maggio, Jr., director of the department's Agri-Business opera-
45. Rachal killed Mitchell because Mitchell called the kid an "asshole"-one of the
most derogatory terms that one inmate could call another. If Rachal had let the insult
pass, someone would have next attempted to make him a slave. A couple of Mitchell's
enemies, who wanted Mitchell out of the way, convinced the kid he had to kill him. It
was an old convict's ploy and it cost Rachel his life.
46. Williams, 547 F.2d at 1208.
47. Id.
48. The West/Polozola ruling was not reported in the Federal Supplement; it simply
became known as the "court order."
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tions, was appointed warden of Angola. Armed with the court order,
Phelps stated that their job was to regain control of Angola, make it
responsible to Headquarters, and stop the violence. Maggio was vested
with whatever power needed to do the job. A tough, no-nonsense man,
Maggio forcefully seized control of the prison, dealing with the criminal
power-brokers, as well as the security power-brokers, on any terms they
wanted to deal. He cracked down on the violence-and he cracked down
hard. Beefing up his security force and equipping them with a variety of
electronic devices, he instituted massive security measures. He disrupted
the traditional living patterns of the inmates and deliberately upset and re-
arranged the entire power structure within the prison. Inmate gang leaders
were put out of business, locked up in maximum security or transferred
to other parts of the prison, making them ineffective. Inmates in critical
clerical positions were replaced by free personnel, ending their control and
influence on those sensitive positions.
A new and streamlined system of government was created at Angola.
A massive $34 million construction program was undertaken by the Phelps-
Maggio regime which resulted in the erection of Camps C, D and J and a
new dining hall in the Main Prison Complex. Medical services were im-
proved, a correctional training academy was established, and educational
and recreational programs were expanded. One year after they had as-
sumed the reins of power and two years after the court order was issued,
the Phelps-Maggio regime had fulfilled the basic objectives of the court
order. When Maggio departed Angola in 1978 to become warden at the
Hunt Correctional Center in St. Gabriel, the prison, which had once been
the bloodiest in the nation, had been converted into the safest maximum
security facility in the nation.
CONCLUSION
For the most part, prison reform in other states was brought about by
zealous reformists, conscientious lawmakers and attorney activists who
pursued prisoners' rights litigation with a strategy aimed at change. Unlike
those states, the emergence of prison reform in Louisiana in the late 1970s
evolved solely from a reluctant marriage carved out by the nature of
peculiar circumstances affecting the state's penal system. First, there has
been very little involvement by the state's legal profession in the develop-
ment of prisoners' rights and efforts to change Louisiana's penal system.
And with the exception of the Louisiana Coalition on Jails and Prisons,
which was unable to influence any meaningful change in the state's prison
system, civil rights groups such as the ACLU and NAACP have not in-
volved themselves in any organized effort to either define or protect pris-
oners' rights, much less develop a strategy for prison reform.
Moreover, right-wing politics over the last decade have so paralyzed
progressive thinking that conscientious penal administrators have been
unable to develop a rational and responsible penal philosophy. More often
than not, they have been forced to do the convenient rather that the right
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thing. Consequently, while the state's prison system was locked in the grips
of violence and lawlessness, the normal forces of change were either dis-
interested or neutralized by conservative politics. The federal court was
the only moral leader willing to respond to the cries for relief coming from
the hellish confines of Angola. The feelings of many corrections officials
around the state have been expressed by Phelps and Maggio who have
often stated that federal court intervention was a godsend, that prison
reform could not have been achieved without it.
But the bond between prisoners and the federal court is fraying at the
seams. Forces are already in motion that could very well shut the door of
federal court to most prisoner litigation.4 9 Some want the door shut for
unholy reasons, while others have simply grown tired of what has become
known as "frivolous litigation." To be sure, there have been too many
frivolous lawsuits filed, and the courts have been abused by a handful of
jailhouse lawyers.5 0 And it is understandable that the federal court has a
problem with using its precious time and resources in settling petty argu-
ments between keeper and kept about a confiscated pair of blue jeans,
misplaced stamps, or damaged radio. Handling such trivial disagreements
was not the intent of the federal court when it intervened in Sinclair v.
Henderson and Williams v. Edwards. However, that the federal court is
constantly called upon to deal with such complaints is accusing testimony
that the Department of Corrections has acted irresponsibly in failing to set
up a system-wide grievance procedure.5
Since the Department of Corrections lacks a meaningful grievance
procedure, the federal court is looked upon as the only avenue of relief.
But certainly this is preferable to encouraging inmates to believe violence
and rebellion are their only recourse. With the federal courts' power of
summary dismissal and its power to enjoin those who abuse the process,
charges that the courts are overburdened with frivolous lawsuits have a
false ring. If our free and democratic society is to remain committed to
protecting the rights of all its people, then there must be judicial tolerance
for some apparently frivolous litigation. The strength of our system of
government lies in its willingness to keep its courtroom doors unlocked,
no matter how costly or inconvenient. That is the price of Democracy.
Even after more than a decade of federal court intervention, the leg-
islature has failed to develop a rational penal philosophy for the state of
Louisiana. It has entrenched in an incarceration attitude, so much so that
Louisiana has the highest incarceration rate in the nation. The Department
of Corrections is taking in one hundred more inmates each month than it
is releasing. Given that reality, it is even more essential that the federal
court remain the big brother of the state's prison system. That role of
49. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.
Ct. 3194 (1984); Collins v. King, .743 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1984).
50. Green v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1983).
51. Johnson v. King, 696 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1983).
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judicial activism will inevitably contribute to more frivolous litigation being
filed by inmates, but that is a small price to pay for ensuring that the
state's prison system will remain safe and that constitutional guarantees
will be upheld.
